Multi-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
How can differences in priorities help both parties?
A package comparison and a communication-channel rationale.
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38 / OpeningMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
The decision and the learning goals
Identify differences in priorities across issues
Compare complete packages rather than haggling issue by issue
Choose a communication approach suited to the situation
90-minute workshopOpening 5 minConcepts and original examples 35 minPractice 25 minDebrief 15 minReview 10 min
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Issues can have compatible, opposed or different priorities
A multi-issue negotiation can contain issues on which interests align, issues with directly opposed preferences and issues each party values differently. Treating every issue as distributive can leave mutually beneficial trades undiscovered.
The New Recruit payoff tables make the distinctions explicit. Job assignment can have an outcome both sides prefer. Other issues provide opportunities to trade something relatively inexpensive to one side for something more valuable to the other. Understanding the priorities requires information about the package rather than only the headline salary.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Different priorities create gains from trade
The source’s bonus schedule gives the candidate 4,000 points for 10% and the recruiter 0. At 2%, the candidate receives 0 and the recruiter 1,600. Vacation has a different pattern: five days give the recruiter 4,000 and the candidate 0; twenty-five days give the recruiter 0 and the candidate 1,600.
Holding other issues fixed, high bonus with low vacation produces 8,000 joint points. Low bonus with high vacation produces only 3,200. Trading across the issues can create more joint value because the parties’ relative priorities differ.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Claiming and creating value
Claiming value concerns distribution. Creating value finds combinations that improve the joint outcome because the parties value issues differently.
Claiming
Improving your share of the available value.
Creating
Finding arrangements that produce more joint value through differences in priorities, timing, risk or capabilities.
Worked application
Illustrative application: a client values early delivery more than extended support, while a supplier finds basic support less costly. An early/basic package can outperform a compromise made separately on each issue. Price can then allocate some of the additional value between them.
Explore priorities and packages before assuming every issue has equal and opposite importance. A useful joint result must still be acceptable to each party.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Classify issues
Type
Relationship
Distributive
A gain for one side is a loss for the other on that issue.
Compatible
Both sides prefer the same option.
Integrative opportunity
Different priorities allow a useful exchange across issues.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Fixed-pie assumptions hide opportunities
Do not assume every issue has opposite interests.
Do not assume both sides rank the issues in the same order.
Ask about reasons and priorities without carelessly revealing every limit.
Compare packages rather than settling each issue in isolation.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Illustrative priorities: client and supplier
Issue / option
Client points
Supplier points
Delivery early
80
0
Delivery later
0
20
Support extended
20
0
Support basic
0
40
Add points across the two issues. Points represent invented preferences, not money.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Packages create different joint value
Package
Client
Supplier
Joint points
Early + extended
100
0
100
Early + basic
80
40
120
Later + extended
20
20
40
Later + basic
0
60
60
The early/basic package uses the parties’ different priorities. Other issues may allow sharing value differently.
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
New Recruit payoff table: compatible issues
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
New Recruit payoff table: integrative issues
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
13,200 versus 4,800: the cost of splitting the difference
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
New Recruit's efficient frontier
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Integrative versus distributive frontiers
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Pareto efficiency and distribution are separate questions
An agreement is Pareto efficient within the modeled alternatives when no available change can improve one party’s outcome without worsening the other’s. The source frontier plots combinations of recruiter and candidate outcomes.
Efficiency does not identify a unique fair allocation. Several points can lie on the frontier and divide value very differently. A point inside the frontier suggests an unexploited improvement. Search for a better package before focusing exclusively on how to divide the current package.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Contingent agreements turn different forecasts into terms
Parties may disagree about a future outcome while both believe their own forecast. A contingent term specifies what happens if an observable condition occurs. This can bridge a disagreement without forcing the parties to agree on one probability estimate.
The condition must be measurable, verifiable and difficult to manipulate. Consider who controls the outcome and whether the payment creates a harmful incentive. The communication-channel material adds another dimension: the medium can affect cues, reflection and the risk of misinterpreting the counterpart.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
New Recruit: two issues and their joint value
Derived directly from the bonus and vacation schedules in Halevy’s New Recruit debrief.
Package, other issues held fixed
Recruiter points
Candidate points
Joint points
10% bonus + 5 vacation days
4,000
4,000
8,000
10% bonus + 25 vacation days
0
5,600
5,600
2% bonus + 5 vacation days
5,600
0
5,600
2% bonus + 25 vacation days
1,600
1,600
3,200
This isolates two issues for explanation. The full exercise includes additional issues, so these totals are not the total score for a complete New Recruit agreement.
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38 / Deep diveMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Northpoint PT: two packages, same price
Relay's illustrative 3-year values in $k relative to a $250 contract on standard terms. Each $1/location/month = 42 x 36 = 1,512 location-months = $1.512k.
Both packages price at $295/location/month. Package A splits the difference on price and accepts both of Northpoint's protections. Package B uses the parties' different priorities: Relay values data and reference rights; Northpoint values reliability, staged rollout and protection against a fill rate below 30%.
Northpoint's non-price terms in B are worth +125, so it is indifferent between A and B at -1.512 x (P - 250) + 125 = 21.96, giving P = $318.15. Any price between $295 and about $318 divides the extra $240k of joint value.
Term
Relay
Northpoint
Package A
Package B
Price $295 vs $250 (1.512 x 45)
+68.04
-68.04
Yes
Yes
De-identified data rights for model training
+90
-15
No
Yes
Case study and reference rights
+45
-5
No
Yes
99.9% uptime SLA with service credits
-20
+50
Yes
Yes
Termination for convenience after year 1
-60
+40
Yes
No
Fill-rate guarantee (below 30% in months 4-9: price to $250)
-10
+35
No
Yes
Two-wave rollout, all 42 billed from month 1
+20
+60
No
Yes
Total: Relay / Northpoint / joint
-11.96 / +21.96 / +10.0
+193.04 / +56.96 / +250.0
All values are illustrative. Data rights depend on de-identification standards, the BAA and Northpoint's consent, and need legal review.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Efficiency and distribution are separate
An efficient agreement cannot improve one party without worsening another within the feasible set.
There may be several efficient agreements with different distributions.
A high joint total does not automatically make the result acceptable to each side.
Alternatives and constraints still matter.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
A contingent agreement
A contingent term links part of the agreement to an observable future event. It can address different forecasts when measurement, incentives and enforcement are workable.
A disagreement about the future
One party expects a high demand level; the other expects a lower level.
A possible response
Condition part of the agreement on an observable future outcome, if it can be measured and enforced sensibly.
Worked application
Illustrative application: a buyer expects low demand and a supplier expects high demand. A base quantity plus a defined additional payment or quantity if verified demand crosses a threshold may let both act on their beliefs. Specify the measurement period, data source and who can influence the measure.
A contingency can also create disputes or distorted incentives. Evaluate the rule and observability before treating it as a solution.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Communication channels change the process
Channel feature
Possible effect to examine
Rich cues
May aid understanding or intensify an existing competitive interaction.
Asynchronous exchange
Allows reflection but can slow clarification.
Lean written channel
Creates a record but may hide tone or relationship cues.
The negotiation materials emphasize context and orientation; no channel is universally best.
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38 / TheoryMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
An integrative debrief
Which priorities did you discover?
What package was left unexplored?
Did the process help information exchange?
How would another issue or contingency change the feasible choices?
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Contingent contracts
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Gender in negotiation: the role of alternatives
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
A map of communication channels
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Meta-analysis: channel effects by orientation
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38 / Source pageMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
When lean channels help
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38 / ApplicationMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
The New Recruit debrief: differences in priorities
The archived negotiation lecture distinguishes distributive, compatible and integrative issues in a multi-issue negotiation. Its central lesson is to exchange and interpret information about priorities rather than automatically split every issue. The exercise here uses a new self-contained packet.
Which trade creates more value with relatively little sacrifice?
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38 / Current practiceMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Current practice: automated multi-issue deals and outcome-based pricing
Bots that trade across issues
In a three-month 2021 pilot in Canada, Walmart used Pactum's chatbot to negotiate with tail-end suppliers of goods not for resale, such as carts and store equipment. The bot traded issues (for example, longer payment terms in exchange for concessions on Walmart's right-to-terminate clause) and closed deals with 64% of suppliers, saving 1.5% on average. Expanded programs later reported 68% and 3%. The bot was multi-issue by design.
Contingent pricing becomes a product
Intercom prices its Fin AI agent at $0.99 per outcome; a resolution counts when Fin answers and the customer confirms it helped or leaves without asking for more help. Intercom chose this over seat pricing because Fin's value grows as it reduces support headcount and because early customers doubted it would work, the same difference in forecasts that contingent contracts are designed to bridge.
Relay's version
Relay could offer Northpoint a per-filled-slot price alongside the flat fee. At 40% of about 42 open slots a week, a location sees about 72.8 fills a month, so $339 is equivalent to about $4.66 per fill against roughly $110 of visit revenue (illustrative). A precise definition of a 'fill' is what makes the term enforceable.
38 / PracticeMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Compare packages and add one issue
Use the four options and point values on these slides. The client values early delivery most; the supplier values basic support most. Start with no price issue.
Your task
Compare all four packages. Then add a fictional transferable price adjustment that could redistribute 20 points between the sides without changing joint value, and discuss acceptance.
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38 / DebriefMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Worked answer and reasoning
Early delivery with basic support gives 80 client points and 40 supplier points: joint value 120.
Transferring 20 points from client to supplier would make 60/60 if that transfer is feasible under the added issue.
Whether either package is acceptable still depends on alternatives and limits; maximizing the total is not the whole negotiation.
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38 / Venture stepMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Venture step: Build and compare Northpoint packages
Relay · venture step 38
Lesson 37 set Relay's limit at about $209/location/month and its target at $339; Northpoint asked for $250. Discovery calls revealed six issues beyond price. Illustrative 3-year values in $k, relative to a $250 contract on Relay's standard terms (Relay / Northpoint): data rights to de-identified data for model training +90/-15; case study and reference rights +45/-5; 99.9% uptime SLA with service credits -20/+50; termination for convenience after year 1 -60/+40; fill-rate guarantee (price steps down to $250 if fill rate is below 30% in months 4-9) -10/+35; two-wave rollout (12 locations, then 30; all 42 billed from month 1) +20/+60. Each $1/location/month moves $1.512k between the parties.
Your task
Classify each issue, compute Relay's and Northpoint's values for two packages (A: a $295 compromise with SLA and termination for convenience; B: a value-creating package of your design), find the price at which Northpoint is indifferent between them, and choose a channel plan for presenting the packages.
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38 / Venture stepMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Venture step: worked reasoning
Classify: price is distributive; rollout in waves is compatible (both gain: +20/+60); data rights, case study, SLA and the fill-rate guarantee are integrative (each costs one side much less than it is worth to the other); termination for convenience destroys value (-60/+40 = -20 jointly).
Package A at $295: price 1.512 x 45 = 68.04 to Relay. Relay = 68.04 - 20 - 60 = -11.96; Northpoint = -68.04 + 50 + 40 = +21.96; joint +10.0.
Package B at $295 with data, case study, SLA, fill-rate guarantee and waves: Relay = 68.04 + 90 + 45 - 20 - 10 + 20 = +193.04; Northpoint = -68.04 - 15 - 5 + 50 + 35 + 60 = +56.96; joint +250.0, 25 times package A. The fill-rate guarantee replaces termination for convenience: it gives Northpoint most of the protection it wanted (+35 versus +40) at a sixth of the cost to Relay (-10 versus -60), because Relay expects a 40% fill rate and Northpoint doubts it.
Northpoint's non-price terms in B are worth +125, so it is indifferent between B and A at a price P where -1.512 x (P - 250) + 125 = 21.96, giving P = $318.15. Relay can therefore ask up to about $318 for B and leave Northpoint no worse than under A. A defensible proposal is B at $318 (Relay +227.82, Northpoint +22.18), with room to concede toward $295 to share the gain.
Channel and conditions: learn priorities on a video call (a neutral orientation); send the two packages in writing, simultaneously, so Northpoint can compare them without time pressure. Training on clinic data requires de-identification permitted under the BAA and HIPAA, and Northpoint's approval; that term needs legal review before it is offered.
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38 / DebriefMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
Reasoning traps
Settling issues one at a time
Agreeing price first and then 'the details' makes every later issue a separate tug-of-war and removes the currency for trades. Keep all issues open and exchange packages.
Revealing limits when you mean to reveal priorities
To create value, tell Northpoint that data rights matter a lot to Relay and SLA terms matter less. Do not tell them $209. Priorities enable trades; limits only invite the counterpart to claim value.
Writing contingencies nobody can verify
'Price steps down if Relay underperforms' invites a dispute. Define the metric (fill rate = refilled slots / late-cancellation slots), the period, the data source and the remedy, and check that neither side can game it.
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38 / ReviewMulti-issue negotiation, value creation & channels
What you can now explain
A Northpoint package comparison: issue classification, package A (+$10k joint) versus package B (+$250k joint), Northpoint's indifference price of about $318, a contingent fill-rate term, and a channel plan.
Joint value comes from compatible issues and from trading issues the parties value differently; issue-by-issue compromise leaves most of it on the table (4,800 of 13,200 points in New Recruit).
Contingent terms turn different forecasts into a deal, provided the condition is measurable, verifiable and hard to manipulate.
Efficiency and distribution are separate decisions, and the channel should fit the parties' orientation: rich channels to learn priorities in a neutral setting, lean channels to compare packages or de-escalate.
Next lesson: The business narrative & evidence portfolio
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Check your understanding
How can differences in priorities help both parties?
Score
Question 1
In New Recruit, the maximum joint outcome is 13,200 points and splitting the difference on every issue yields 4,800. What share of the available joint value does the issue-by-issue compromise give up?
Lost value = 13,200 - 4,800 = 8,400 points; 8,400/13,200 = 63.6%. The 36% option is the share retained. Compromise feels fair on each issue but ignores differences in priorities and includes a mutually worse job assignment.
Question 2
Northpoint values termination for convenience at +$40k, and it costs Relay $60k. A fill-rate guarantee is worth +$35k to Northpoint and costs Relay $10k. What does swapping the first for the second do to joint value?
Old term: -60 + 40 = -20 joint. New term: -10 + 35 = +25 joint. Change = +45: Relay +50, Northpoint -5. Relay can pay Northpoint back the 5 (for example, about $3.31/location/month on price) and still keep about $45k.
Question 3
Relay believes its fill rate will be 40%; Northpoint's CFO thinks 25% is more likely. Price talks have stalled at $295 versus $340. Which term best uses the disagreement?
Each side expects to win the bet, so the contingent price is worth more to both than a fixed midpoint. The term must be measurable and hard to manipulate, hence a defined metric and auditable data source. Splitting the difference ignores the difference in forecasts.
Question 4
A team reaches an agreement that is on the Pareto frontier. Which statement is correct?
Efficiency is about waste, not fairness. The New Recruit frontier runs from (-4.8, 13.2) to (13.2, -4.8): efficient points can be lopsided and even below one party's alternative. Distribution and BATNAs remain separate questions.
Question 5
The Northpoint talks became adversarial after a failed pilot demo. Maya plans a two-hour video call to 'clear the air and close.' Based on the channel meta-analysis, what is the better plan?
Swaab and colleagues found channel richness helps neutral parties and hurts competitive ones. A written proposal lowers the temperature and gives time to evaluate trades; a call can follow once the orientation is less competitive. 'Always' is the misconception.
Question 6
In Relay's package B, Northpoint's non-price terms are worth +$125k and package A gives Northpoint +$21.96k. With each $1/location/month worth $1.512k, at what price is Northpoint indifferent between B and A?
-1.512 x (P - 250) + 125 = 21.96, so P - 250 = 103.04/1.512 = 68.15 and P = $318.15. $295 is package A's price; $333 ignores the 21.96 Northpoint already gets under A.
Workbook
How can differences in priorities help both parties?
Module output: A negotiation brief, package comparison and individual decision portfolio.
Library
Every original page used in this lesson
10 appear in the slides with notes; the rest are kept here for reference.
Multi-issue negotiation: New RecruitSection title page for the New Recruit exercise, in which a recruiter and a candidate negotiate eight employment terms. Title page only.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 9 · top slide
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New Recruit debrief questionsDebrief prompts: did you identify the differences in priorities across issues, and what did you do to uncover them? Sets up the fixed-pie discussion.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 9 · bottom slide
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The fixed-pie biasNegotiators often assume their interests are directly opposed on every issue and that both sides rank the issues identically; together these beliefs produce the fixed-pie bias. The native slide on fixed-pie assumptions covers the same point.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 10 · top slide
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Information exchange in negotiationAn illustration of two negotiators beside a filing cabinet, with a thought bubble showing a paper on the information dilemma in negotiation (Murnighan and colleagues). The dilemma: sharing priorities enables value creation but can expose you to value claiming. Share priorities, not limits.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 10 · bottom slide
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New Recruit payoff table: compatible issuesThe full payoff table for eight issues with recruiter and candidate points. Job assignment and location are highlighted as compatible: both sides score highest on the same option (Division A; San Francisco). The maximum joint outcome is 13,200 points. Compatible issues need no trade, only discovery. Pairs who assume opposition can still settle on a worse division or city, a loss for both that no bargaining skill on other issues can recover.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 12 · top slide · in the slides
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New Recruit payoff table: integrative issuesThe same table with bonus and moving expenses marked as mattering more to the candidate, and vacation and insurance marked as mattering more to the recruiter. Salary and starting date are distributive. The value comes from relative priorities, not absolute preferences. The candidate gives up vacation, which costs her little, to get bonus, which is worth a lot to her, and the recruiter does the reverse.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 12 · bottom slide · in the slides
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13,200 versus 4,800: the cost of splitting the differenceThe payoff table with the conclusion: the maximum joint outcome is 13,200 points, while splitting the difference on every issue yields a joint outcome of only 4,800 points. Compromise issue by issue destroys 8,400 points (64% of the available value) even though it looks fair. In the table, the split takes Division C on job assignment, costing both sides 1,200, and the middle options on every integrative issue.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 13 · top slide · in the slides
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The Pareto-efficient frontier: definitionPareto's definition: an agreement is efficient when no other agreement makes one party better off without making the other worse off; any inefficient agreement can be improved for at least one party at no cost to the other. The native slide on efficiency and distribution covers this definition.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 13 · bottom slide
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New Recruit's efficient frontierA plot of efficient agreements in thousands of points, running from (-4.8, 13.2) through (2.4, 10.8), (6.6, 6.6) and (10.8, 2.4) to (13.2, -4.8) for recruiter and candidate. Efficiency does not settle distribution: the points range from a large win for one side to a large win for the other, and only the central part reaches the 13,200 joint maximum. Find the frontier first, then argue about where on it to land.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 14 · top slide · in the slides
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Integrative versus distributive frontiersTwo frontiers on the same axes: a straight line for distributive bargaining, where one party's gain is exactly the other's loss, and a curve that bulges outward for integrative bargaining, because over some ranges one party gives up little to create a lot for the other. The space between the curve and the line is the value created by trading on differences in priorities. Pure distributive negotiators can only move along the straight line.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 14 · bottom slide · in the slides
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Contingent contractsParties often disagree about the probability of future events or differ in risk and time preferences. They can avoid impasse and improve outcomes by adding contingent clauses that condition future actions on agreed criteria: if X, then Y. A contingency turns a disagreement about forecasts into a tradable term: each side bets on its own forecast. It works only with a measurable, verifiable condition that neither side can easily manipulate.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 15 · top slide · in the slides
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Gender in negotiation: the role of alternativesA chart from Dannals, Zlatev, Halevy and Neale (2021, Journal of Applied Psychology; 2,552 negotiators including executives, working adults and students). With weak alternatives, women and men extracted similar points (about 4,870 and 4,790); with strong alternatives, men extracted more (about 5,750 versus 5,370). The gender gap appeared only when alternatives were strong: having power did not translate into value equally. Organizations can reduce gaps by making alternatives and ranges explicit, for example through pricing guidance for every account executive.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 15 · bottom slide · in the slides
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Online versus in-person negotiationA question page contrasting effects on process (emotional expression, information exchange, efficiency) with effects on outcomes (likelihood of agreement, what gets on the table). Framing for the channel material that follows.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 19 · top slide
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A map of communication channelsChannels placed on two axes: synchronous versus asynchronous, and visual and vocal cues versus text only. Face-to-face and video calls are rich and synchronous, voice mail is asynchronous with vocal cues, and email is lean and asynchronous. Channel choice is two separate decisions: how many cues (sight, sound) and whether replies are immediate. Each can be chosen for a stage of the negotiation.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 19 · bottom slide · in the slides
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Interpreting non-verbal behaviorA study by Aviezer, Trope and Todorov showing that viewers misread intense emotions from faces alone and relied on body cues to tell winners from losers. Facial expressions on a video call carry less information than people assume.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 20 · top slide
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Sight, sound and synchronicity: when they matterRicher channels help when parties have a neutral orientation, hurt when they are competitive, and make little difference when they are cooperative. The meta-analysis on the next page supplies the effect sizes.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 20 · bottom slide
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Meta-analytic questionA title page asking how sight, sound and synchrony affect the process and outcomes of negotiation and group decisions. Introduces the meta-analysis.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 21 · top slide
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Meta-analysis: channel effects by orientationEffect sizes (Cohen's d) from Swaab, Galinsky, Medvec and Diermeier's meta-analysis (Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2012; the slide footer says 2013). With a neutral orientation, visual, vocal and synchronous channels improved outcome quality (d = 0.51, 0.53, 0.58); with a cooperative orientation, effects were near zero (0.14, 0.08, 0.04); with a noncooperative orientation, they hurt (-1.05, -0.38, -0.57). Visual cues hurt most when parties are competitive (d = -1.05). Video is the right default for a neutral first meeting and the wrong one when a dispute has turned adversarial.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 21 · bottom slide · in the slides
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When lean channels helpLean channels can be beneficial when you are the weaker or lower-status party, when you need time to think through trade-offs, when the relationship is competitive and distance allows de-escalation, when both sides are committed to the process, and when stepping back helps the parties focus on the forest rather than the trees. For a multi-issue package, a written proposal gives both sides time to evaluate trades they would reject if pressed live. Use rich channels to learn priorities and lean ones to compare packages.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 22 · top slide · in the slides
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QuestionsA closing photograph with the word 'Questions?'. No content.Halevy - Negotiation Slides · PDF page 22 · bottom slide